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Community-based organizations (CBOs) are long-standing and in-
valuable participants in employment and social services delivery sys-
tems. Among their strengths are their ability to represent communities 
that are often sidelined by other institutions and their capacity to deliver 
a broad range of social services to those communities as independent 
providers or as subcontractors of local and state governments. The one-
stop career center (OSCC) system was started by the U.S. Department 
of Labor (USDOL) in 1994 and was formally established by the Work-
force Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 as the institutional frontline outlet 
to deliver workforce development services to job seekers and employ-
ers.1 The primary objective of this paper is to identify the factors that in-
fluence the positioning of CBOs in relation to local OSCC systems. The 
primary data for the study are provided by structured interviews with 
the heads and staff of 28 selected CBOs representing a cross section of 
organizations from around the nation. In some cases, we performed site 
visits and conducted multiple interviews.2 
The implementation of the WIA affected various aspects of CBOs’ 
operations. CBOs faced funding problems in the transition from a con-
tract- to a performance-based system, as well as in fulfilling other report-
ing requirements demanded by the law (Plastrik and Taylor 2001). This 
difficult transition forced some CBOs out of the system; others chose 
to leave the WIA-funded system rather than change their programs or 
engage in the substantive costs associated with participating in the sys-
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tem. However, CBO engagement with the OSCC system has proven 
successful to the extent that CBOs have undertaken significant manage-
ment and operational changes to accommodate the newer philosophical 
principles and operational guidelines established by the WIA. Some of 
the most significant challenges involve service integration, staff devel-
opment, and strategies for service coordination (Heldrich Center for 
Workforce Development 2002).3 Many of the CBOs that adapted suc-
cessfully to the WIA transition had previously implemented successful 
programs targeting welfare recipients. The Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) induced greater devolution in 
programming and service delivery and increased the use of CBOs as 
subcontractors in a widely decentralized system of providers. CBOs 
were encouraged to participate in Welfare-to-Work programs because 
they are often cost-effective providers and can reach targeted popula-
tions (Nightingale 2001, 2002; Sanger 2000). 
The contracting of Welfare-to-Work programs and the adaptation of 
CBOs to the new WIA regulations (in many areas implementing a strict 
work first approach) may have resulted in locking in CBOs to provid-
ing services for the very hard-to-serve or hard-to-engage populations 
that have been left behind by providers seeking more lucrative wel-
fare markets (Sanger 2000; Withorn 2002). For small CBOs, achieving 
economies of scale and tracking outcomes in service provision are dif-
ficult tasks, which increasingly force them to become specialized ser-
vice providers at the bottom of the subcontracting chain, serving few 
clients. This dynamic could be creating an entire class of subordinate 
subcontractors lacking influence in the overall structure of the local 
service delivery system. In the context of the WIA, CBO specializa-
tion is most common in core and intensive services, less so in training 
services. Thus the potential for this kind of downward specialization is 
present. Notwithstanding previous case study research, which suggests 
that CBOs have had a difficult time adapting to new performance stan-
dards, more recent in-depth studies suggest that some large CBOs have 
been quite effective at creating management systems that satisfy perfor-
mance-based contracting and at overcoming other WIA-induced com-
pliance and performance issues. In terms of CBOs adding value to the 
OSCCs, the evidence from these case studies points to their significant 
contributions in such areas as program integration, outreach, network 
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consolidation, and services to the hard-to-serve (Borges-Méndez and 
Meléndez 2002a,b; Meléndez, Kohler-Hausmann, and Borges-Méndez 
2002; Meléndez, Donohue, and Borges-Méndez 2002). 
In general, we found that the structural relationship between CBOs 
and OSCCs is more complex than simply one of inclusion or exclu-
sion. The implementation of the WIA has produced, as is suggested by 
the literature on the topic, a multifaceted landscape of CBO position-
ing. We found three discernible types of CBO relations to local OSCC 
systems: 1) CBOs as primary operators of OSCCs, 2) CBOs in a peer-
to-peer network comanaging OSCCs, and 3) CBOs as subordinate par-
ticipants in OSCCs. These three types of CBO positioning in the OSCC 
system are explained in more detail in the next section of the paper. 
The two sections after that discuss the regulatory, environmental, and 
organizational factors that influence CBO positioning. Evidently, CBO 
positioning is influenced by the legal framework of the WIA and the 
greater autonomy in implementation it gives to local authorities and 
stakeholders. The main finding in this regard is that the WIA regulatory 
regime has not produced a uniform set of conditions for CBO inclusion. 
Positioning, to a large extent, is historically and contextually bounded. 
In addition to examining the regulatory regime, we identify and dis-
cuss important environmental factors such as the characteristics of job 
seekers, communities, and local labor markets, variety and density of 
intermediaries, and the politics of devolution at the local and state lev-
els which interact with the regulatory regime. Equally important for 
CBOs’ positioning are their history and background, their commitment 
to certain sets of values and mission, and other organizational charac-
teristics such as size, staffing, leadership, and the networking capacity 
or connectedness of these organizations to other stakeholders. Overall, 
our findings suggest that a combination of regulatory pressures and en-
vironmental factors are inducing forms of CBO specialization in the 
provision of workforce development services. Further, CBO special-
ization and adaptation bear significant costs to CBOs in terms of the 
resources and professional expertise needed to successfully meet regu-
latory demands and in terms of their historical commitment to serving 
disadvantaged populations. CBOs regularly find themselves managing 
the dilemma of commitment versus compliance. The last section of the 
paper draws the policy implications of the research. 
80  Borges-Méndez and Meléndez
CBO-OSCC TYPES
The first step in the analysis is to define the relationship between 
CBOs and OSCCs and then categorize CBOs based on the proposed 
typology of CBO engagement with the OSCC system. The relationship 
between CBOs and OSCCs is defined strictly based on their contrac-
tual responsibility to local authorities in relation to the operations of 
the OSCCs. To support our definitions and typology we carried out an 
extensive bibliographic review of the first four years of the implemen-
tation of the WIA, which included academic material, program evalu-
ations, government documents and reports, and websites on workforce 
development. In this research, we also identified programs and cases in 
various parts of the country that could provide insight into the dynam-
ics of CBO positioning, and we looked at whether previous systematic 
research on the positioning of intermediaries in emerging workforce 
development systems suggested identifiable types of positioning, espe-
cially for CBOs. The bibliographic research was accompanied by inter-
views of a broad group of practitioners in workforce development, aca-
demics, government administrators, and representatives of foundations, 
think tanks, and professional associations. Using this information, we 
selected 28 organizations from around the nation for our inquiry. We 
then conducted in-depth interviews with the organizations’ directors 
and staff, and on several occasions we went on site visits. 
Upon reviewing our cases we have identified three broad types of 
contractual relationships: 
1) CBOs as primary operator and manager of one or many OS-
CCs. In these cases, local authorities have delegated most or all 
OSCC operational authority to CBOs. CBOs are responsible 
for engaging other partners in providing services, deciding on 
the allocation of core, intensive, and often, training services; 
and collecting and evaluating performance data for subcontrac-
tors. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Though we 
found three variations of CBOs as primary operators, in each 
case the CBO acts as the primary decision maker in regard to 
the allocation of services. It can provide these services directly 
or subcontract them to other CBOs and service providers. In 
some circumstances, these CBOs operate multiple OSCCs in 
the city or region.
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2)  CBOs in a peer-to-peer network with other CBOs (and other 
stakeholders) sharing operations and management of one or 
many OSCCs. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.2. In 
this type, one of the CBOs operates as managing partner but a 
local authority is often in charge of approving service provision 
and the monitoring and collection of performance data. Part-
ners in the network often share in the delivery of services, and 
components of system management are shared among various 
operators.
3)  CBOs as subordinate participants offering specialized services 
at OSCCs held and managed by other organizations. Figure 3.3 
illustrates this relationship. In these cases, CBOs are subcon-
tractors of core, intensive, or training services and do not share 
any responsibilities for system management with other service 
providers.
Based on the criteria explained above for the CBO and OSCC ty-
pology of contractual relationships, we classified the selected cases into 
groups corresponding to the three types of management and service 
delivery roles reported by the CBOs. Table 3.1 summarizes the distri-
bution of cases by type of CBO operator. A little more than half of the 
cases (16) selected for the study fall into the category of CBOs as pri-
mary operators of OSCCs. Of the remaining cases, five were classified 
as peer-to-peer and seven as subordinate OSCC operators. The distri-
bution is not intended to show the numeric predominance of one type 
over others but rather to flesh out the ideal types we have outlined and 
investigated. Also, some CBOs can be classified both as primary opera-
tors and as peer-to-peer because of the broad scope and extension of 
their programmatic activity. The selection, though strategic, does seem 
to indicate that the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy is a rather narrow 
way of discussing and representing CBO positioning, and that some 
CBOs have managed their successful transition into the new regime 
while absorbing the local environmental pressures. This is not to say 
that CBOs on the opposite side of the equation have been experiencing 
subordination and further exclusion. The rest of this section of the study 
presents a detailed discussion of the characteristics of CBOs based on 
the typology of cases identified above.
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Figure 3.1  Types of CBO Positioning











The CBO manages multiple OSCCs.
The CBO manages a single OSCC, or the CBO is an OSCC.
A large CBO manages an OSCC and hosts other 
CBOs as partners that provide specialized services.
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Figure 3.2  Types of CBO Positioning




CBO(s) in horizontal/networked relation with other stakeholders.
Figure 3.3  Types of CBO Positioning














operator Name of organization
Primary Unity Council (UC), Oakland, CA
El Proyecto del Barrio, Los Angeles, CA
New Community Corporation (NCC), Newark , NJ
Opportunities Industrialization Center West (OICW), Menlo Park, CA
United Migrant Opportunity Services (UMOS), Milwaukee, WI
North Texas Human Resource Group (NTHRG), north-central Texas counties, TX
Career Resources Inc. (CRI), Louisville, KY
Central City Concern (CCC), Portland, OR
Asian Resources Inc. (ARI), Sacramento, CA
Job Connection (JC), Atlantic City/Cape May, NJ
Friendly House (FH), Phoenix, AZ
Goodwill Industries (GI), North Charleston, SC
SER-Miami, Miami, FL
Los Angeles Urban League (LAUL), Los Angeles, CA
Jewish Vocational Services (JVS), Boston, MA
SER Metro-Detroit, Detroit, MI
Peer-to-peer Denver Employment Alliance (DEA), Denver, CO
Chicago Jobs Council (CJC), Chicago, IL
San Diego Career Opportunities Partners (SDCOP), San Diego, CA
Boston Career Link CBO Partnership, Boston, MA
Detroit’s Workplace of Jewish Vocational Services (DWP), Detroit, MI
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Subordinate HART, Hartford, CT
Hartford Construction Jobs Initiative/Jobs Funnel, Hartford, CT
Southeast Works (SEW), Portland, OR
Acercamiento Hispano/Hispanic Outreach (AH/HO), Columbia, SC
Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC) Phoenix, AZ
Arizona Call-a-Teen (ACAT), Phoenix, AZ
American Youth Works (AYW), Austin, TX
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CBOs as Primary Operators
CBOs that are primary OSCC operators do collaborate with a broad 
range of mandated partners, exert leadership and stewardship, and at-
tract and sponsor other actors who may want to be part of the OSCC. 
However, in such a scenario, one CBO tends to front or “underwrite” 
the costs associated with providing services, complying with local reg-
ulations, and maintaining the institutional and physical infrastructure of 
the OSCCs (and satellite centers). That is, one CBO is the anchor and 
manager of the OSCC. In more general terms, CBOs have become the 
backbone of some local and regional social and employment service 
delivery systems, often participating actively in the governance of these 
systems. The interdependence between CBOs and the delivery infra-
structure can be attributed to diverse factors ranging from the histori-
cal expertise of organizations to the local implementation of outsourc-
ing services. It is worth noting that local and state administrators and 
elected officials often see CBOs (and other intermediaries in service 
delivery) as a flexible management option, particularly in comparison 
to state bureaucracies. They often use subcontracting to CBOs as a way 
to bypass or sidestep frontline implementation problems related either 
to program interfacing or to human resource management in the public 
sector.  
The evidence gathered regarding the general characteristics of 
CBOs that function as primary OSCC operators is summarized in Table 
3.2. The data suggest that most of these CBOs are well positioned to 
assume a leadership role in the OSCC service delivery system. They 
are often large, multiservice organizations operating facilities in vari-
ous localities within the city or metropolitan area. They have assumed 
a leadership role in the community, and their board members are often 
well connected to local government. Given their management experi-
ence and size of operation, these CBOs have adapted their operations 
not only to comply with the numerous and cumbersome regulations 
induced by the WIA but also to add to the system through the enhanced 
coordination with other organizations, the integration of services from 
various funding sources, and the legitimacy to orchestrate system op-
erations.
When CBOs assume direct responsibility and authority for manag-
ing OSCCs, it is often the case that local Workforce Investment Boards 
CBOs and the One-Stop Career Center System   87
(WIBs) authorize a list of providers heavily composed of CBOs. Ser-
vice providers can become WIB-certified through a well structured and 
competitive process, or through a more flexible and negotiated approach 
that includes other social, political, and economic considerations, such 
as the need to meet service gaps in particular distressed geographic areas 
or neighborhoods. As a primary OSCC operator, a CBO may guide the 
development of OSCCs along various lines of specialization, depend-
ing, for instance, on the mission and practical and philosophical stance 
of the organization in regard to economic development. For example, a 
CBO may guide an OSCC to strongly combine support service provi-
sion with core and intensive services. Others may assemble services 
to strongly emphasize career-ladder development in targeted industrial 
sectors and in close contact with employers.
Table 3.2  Description of CBO as Primary OSCC Operator
• Mostly old (20 years +), large CBOs with multimillion dollar budgets 
($8+ million) and various sites in a geographic area.
• Often affiliate of national umbrella organization. Can be stand-alone CBO.
• Some available resources for adaptation and experimentation.
• Clear mission statement, often grounded in group identity and geography.
• Operates in large metropolitan and diversified labor market. 
• Internal multidivisional specialization with professional staff, often with 
special division to manage workforce development services and various 
OSCCs (or one very large OSCC).
• Has incorporated some performance-management practices into service 
delivery.
• Commonly provides core, intensive, and training services in an integrated 
fashion, or at least core and intensive without subcontracting.
• Strong function as a political steward in local affairs (as well as an impor-
tant service provider). 
• Government may charter operation/management of the entire public WD 
and OSCC system to CBO. CBO can be the backbone of WD system.
• Also performs public accountability and advocacy roles.
• Board members tend to have political visibility.
• Networking is important yet not the gravity point of its activity in the WD 
system. Can behave as an independent player. Can keep competition at 
bay through political mechanisms.
• Relation with employers can be strong and collaborative.
88  Borges-Méndez and Meléndez
CBOs in a Peer-to-Peer Network 
CBOs can also join forces to manage OSCCs as members of a peer 
network. Local authorities may choose to delegate the management and 
operation of the local OSCC system to a structured collection of CBOs. 
These collaborations or partnerships are likely to be multilevel, with 
some partners having greater responsibility for providing program-
matic expertise, infrastructure, financial, or political resources. There 
can also be a division of labor with regard to the various services and 
contributions that individual CBOs bring to the network. In general, the 
philosophical thrust of the network is a commitment to system-wide 
collaboration and horizontal connectedness among stakeholders of 
various kinds. The management of the system is widely perceived as a 
joint effort between CBOs, and between CBOs and other stakeholders. 
The peer-to-peer network can be a sub-network of service providers 
nested or interconnected to a more encompassing network of public, 
private, and nonprofit organizations. This CBO network can also serve 
as a voice of collective action to achieve various objectives, such as the 
modification of allocating formulae, performance targets, and inter-ju-
risdictional coordination. At a more substantive level, network relation-
ships do intend to meet WIA-driven mandates, but they also combine a 
great deal of activity aimed at promoting and evolving so-called high-
road strategies, which often look beyond work first approaches. Rela- 
tions with employers can be strong and collaborative yet place a strong 
emphasis on the creation of good jobs and corporate citizenship. 
As summarized in Table 3.3, CBOs in peer-to-peer networks and 
collaborations tend to be midsize or large organizations, often manag-
ing various sites, and largely commanding budgets of over $8 million. 
They are willing to experiment with new ideas on networking, such 
as horizontal inter-organizational relations with multiple stakeholders. 
CBOs operating in these networks perceive system management as a 
joint task of many partners. In addition, they are strongly interested in 
connecting workforce development to multiple policy areas to deal with 
regional economic restructuring, urban sprawl, and the declining qual-
ity of jobs. For them, workforce development requires strong leader-
ship to advance stakeholder participation in the system and to elaborate 
strategies that complement standard work first practices under the WIA, 
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such as career-ladder development—the so-called high-road strategies 
of workforce development. 
CBOs as Subordinate Participants in OSCCs
In recent years, the restructuring of social service delivery systems 
has diversified the avenues of inclusion, allowing many different kinds 
of intermediaries to participate in social support functions. But, the re-
Table 3.3  Description of CBO Peer-to-Peer OSCC Operator
• Can be either old, large CBO with multi-million dollar budget ($8+ mil-
lion) and various sites; or mid-size CBO with less than $10 million bud-
get, founded more recently and located on one site. 
• Can be a local/regional organization, or an affiliate of a national one. 
• Willing to experiment with new ideas, especially on networking. Has 
leveraged funding from foundations and other agents for this kind of ac-
tivity. Interested in innovations in WD beyond the mandates of the law.
• Mission statement grounded in group or functional identity, but with 
commitment to system democratization, equity, and horizontal interorga-
nizational relations. 
• Perceives system management as the joint task of many partners pulling 
their strengths together. Engages in peer-to-peer networking and shares 
in a division of labor on the management, design, and provision of WD 
activity and products. 
• Internal multidivisional specialization with professional staff, often with 
dept. to manage WD services and various OSCCs. Strategic interest in 
integrating WD to other policy areas to deal with regional problems and 
economic restructuring (sprawl, new economy, quality of jobs). WD 
treated not as a traditional human/social service, but as a matter of long-
term human/social development. Complementary WD activity to chal-
lenge simple work first approach.
• CBO can be very involved in WD politics and other political issues. 
Strong voice for stakeholders’ participation. 
• CBO leadership participates in broader coalition or organization that has 
system-wide governance aspirations or functions (association of provid-
ers and CBOs; WD councils/coalitions).
• Networking advocates high-road strategies of WD. Strategies pursue 
long-term goals and attempt to mitigate the negative effects of economic 
restructuring.
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structuring has created mixed opportunities, including outright exclu-
sion for some CBOs. In the process of implementing the WIA at the 
local level, a significant number of CBOs are connecting to OSCCs 
as subordinate participants. This pattern of subordinate engagement is 
not necessarily a negative situation, yet it shows that in some employ-
ment support systems, CBOs may lack the operational scale and politi-
cal clout to preside over the operation of an OSCC. In this context, the 
CBO may not relate directly to the WIB or any other public agency, 
but it can act as a subcontractor to a larger contractor upstream in the 
service supply chain, which connects the OSCC to the rest of the gov-
ernance and employment support system. As such, the CBO offers a 
very specialized or narrow service, acting as a gateway to a special 
population.  As depicted in Table 3.4, the CBOs engaged in this fashion 
include small, faith-based organizations as well as organizations that 
serve specific populations such as immigrants and refugees, youth, and 
persons with disabilities.4 For the most part, they were founded recent-
ly, although some may have a longer history, dating to the 1960s. Their 
funding base tends to depend on one major source, with complementary 
funding coming from the local or national philanthropic sector. CBOs 
as subordinate participants have little flexibility to experiment with ser-
vice delivery, and they tend not to hold systematic relations with em-
ployers. These CBOs show interest in networking and collaborating in 
system-building but lack the resources to do so because such activities 
require and consume staff. Their strategic outlook on connecting work-
force development to other policy areas is also rather narrow, unlike 
CBOs in peer-to-peer networks.
CONTEXTUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS  
INFLUENCING CBO POSITIONING
CBOs’ history, mission, and leadership are associated with repre-
senting and advocating for disadvantaged populations and with provid-
ing a broad range of social and human services to them. Much of their 
history and mission are also linked to a specific geography such as a 
neighborhood or barrio, or a section or district of a city, where they stay 
in close contact with their constituents. CBOs also show ample philo-
sophical diversity and uphold values of equality, diversity, and multi-
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culturalism. Sometimes CBOs have different approaches and capacities 
for community development depending upon their experience and time 
of foundation. For example, Unity Council, El Proyecto del Barrio, Op-
portunities Industrialization Center West (OICW), New Community 
Corporation, and United Migrant Opportunity Services (UMOS) were 
founded in the 1960s as a response to the disenfranchisement of mostly 
minority populations and disadvantaged workers. Although they have 
undergone organizational changes since, they have remained committed 
to serving those targeted populations. Further, they have expanded their 
services to reach other populations, such as more recent immigrants and 
refugees, and people with disabilities. More recently founded organiza-
tions align themselves with some of the same philosophical principles, 
yet focus their identity on a specific social or human service. Central 
Table 3.4  Description of CBO as Subordinate OSCC Operator
• Predominantly small CBOs; less than $2 million budget; recently found-
ed, although some have a longer history dating to 1960s. One location. 
Some mid-size CBOs as well have left WD activity.
• Local/neighborhood organizations. May have affiliation to national 
 organization, but that is not the rule. Some CBOs have been created by 
local government.
• Dependent on government funding received directly or through some in-
termediary. May have small contact with local and national philanthropy.
• Strong group identity and commitment to special populations. 
• Little flexibility to experiment. Financial hardship is felt rapidly.
• May manage OSCC. Little capacity for performance management.
• Little internal functional specialization. Maybe 1–2 people devoted to 
WD.
• Connects to WD system as a provider of very specialized service, or as 
 a gateway to special population. Participates as partner through time-
sharing or part-time staffing in OSCCs managed by other agents.
• Board concentrates on internal management issues and maintaining basic 
contact with outside world.
• Would like to network and collaborate in WD system, but it is costly and 
time consuming given the CBO’s small resource base.
• Marginal contact with employers.
• Little or no say in local political affairs.
• Little strategic capability to connect WD to broader policy issues (except 
through coalition-building).
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City Concern (1979) in Portland, Oregon, emerged to provide solutions 
to homelessness; Career Resources (1996) in Louisville, Kentucky, 
evolved out of specific efforts to provide employment services; Asian 
Resources (1980) in Sacramento, California, arose as a social service 
provider for immigrants and refugees; and Job Connection (1990) in 
Atlantic City, New Jersey, separated from the county to become an or-
ganization focused on employment issues.5
 CBOs’ diversity, history, and mission influence their involvement 
in programmatic areas, which can take various forms. Long-term histo-
ry and commitment to targeted issues and populations may be a source 
of legitimacy and political clout, a competitive advantage for participat-
ing in local workforce development systems. CBOs report that previous 
experience managing programs under JTPA or for welfare recipients 
helped them to be chosen to participate in the WIA-funded programs. 
Programmatic commitment can make a CBO a better synergy-building 
organization in a peer-to-peer system because it is considered a trusted 
partner. Multiple commitments in a programmatic agenda, however, can 
also work in the opposite direction, pushing an organization into isola-
tion and contributing to its marginalization from the system. Hartford 
Areas Rally Together (HART) in Hartford, Connecticut, for example, 
has wanted since the early implementation of the WIA to operate an 
OSCC satellite near the Puerto Rican/Latino neighborhood. Because of 
its commitment to a broader urban economic revitalization strategy that 
included workforce development, the organization aggressively tried to 
link its workforce development program activities to urban revitaliza-
tion. After some public protests of the city’s workforce development 
policies, which included a traffic blockade in front of the State House, 
and numerous meetings with government officials, HART decided to 
develop its own job center. The organization’s strong position on this, 
however, slowly changed as it realized how difficult it was to provide 
workforce development services disconnected from the OSCC system. 
Eventually, the HART job center opened an OSCC satellite operation in 
its facilities to enhance services to the community.
Another important consideration influencing a CBO’s positioning is 
the web of inter-organizational relationships CBOs establish with their 
surrounding environment in order to meet their mission and service 
commitments.  Such relationships tend to change through time and are 
historically bounded. In the implementation of the WIA, great emphasis 
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has been placed on the newly acquired autonomy and flexibility of local 
actors in deciding program features and workforce development policy. 
CBOs that are OSCC operators must contend with mandated partner-
ship requirements. In such a context, CBOs’ connectedness to other 
community organizations and government agencies is an important fac-
tor in facilitating the formation of partnerships and collaborations to 
serve the needs of both job seekers and employers. Historically, CBOs, 
for different reasons, have not been well connected to some of the types 
of organizations that may be crucial to developing effective workforce 
development systems, such as business associations, employers, and 
professional organizations. For CBOs, establishing, nurturing, or rede-
fining these relations consumes valuable resources and often requires 
the use of additional professional expertise not readily available in the 
organization. 
In the cases we looked at, CBOs’ connectedness took on various 
expressions regarding their positioning in the OSCC system, especially 
for those that we catalogued as peer-to-peer operators. In Detroit, Jew-
ish Vocational Services connects to another strong primary provider like 
SER Metro-Detroit to manage the city’s OSCC system.6 For the Denver 
Employment Alliance, connectedness has served to minimize bureau-
cratic entanglements, make referrals seamless, and improve geographic 
and cultural access to services by promoting centers at more friendly lo-
cations than in downtown government buildings. For the Chicago Jobs 
Council, a membership organization comprising more than 100 CBOs 
and advocacy organizations, connectedness is related not so much to 
direct service delivery but to accountability, governance, and advocacy 
for disadvantaged workers. The organization seeks mainly to improve 
inclusiveness for CBOs at various levels of policy implementation, but 
especially at the OSCC level.
Primary operators also seek to use their connectedness to manage 
OSCCs, often as effectively as peer-to-peer operators. In the greater 
Detroit metro area, SER has sought connectedness to preserve a regu-
lar interaction with employers, since one of its workforce development 
strategies has been to keep a high profile as a large volume provider of 
services under the WIA. Primary operators, however, tend to be more 
dominant and self-reliant agents in the context of the systems they work 
in. This is a pattern, for example, that we observed in strongly con-
tested and very complex local systems such as in Los Angeles. The 
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Los Angeles City OSCC system, which partially overlaps with the Los 
Angeles County system, relies on 11 CBOs to manage its 15 OSCCs. 
CBOs, for the most part, tend to operate with relative autonomy in rela-
tion to one another and to keep direct relations with the local WIB and 
with the Community Development Department that shares authority in 
managing the public system. In contrast, subordinate operators usually 
lack strong connectedness to other local organizations. As mainly small 
organizations, they have high transaction costs, must deal with staffing 
shortages, and face overwhelming service demands from the neighbor-
hood. Networking, partnerships, and collaborations become an inter-
mittent activity that is pursued very narrowly depending on the specific 
issue under consideration. 
The types described above are not solely the result of implementa-
tion of the law. But the WIA, with other welfare reforms, established 
new rules which set in motion diverse patterns of positioning among 
CBOs. As CBOs sought adaptation, following the law came to involve 
much more than just implementing technical mandates. Significant or-
ganizational and political challenges were part of assuming the chal-
lenge of using the newly gained flexibility that came with the WIA. For 
some CBOs, the shift has been enabling, but for others it has not. What 
are the more specific characteristics of the new regime and their effect 
on CBO positioning?
POLICY CHANGE AND CBOS’ POSITIONING 
CBOs were operating in an increasingly competitive environment 
even prior to the implementation of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 and the 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998. Federal reforms in welfare 
and employment services simply reinforced an existing trend of ex-
cluding CBOs from participating in local employment services. While 
the exclusion of CBOs from the delivery of employment services has 
probably increased overall, numerous CBOs have been combining their 
historical comparative advantages with newer practices to adapt to the 
revamped policy regimes (Cordero-Guzmán 2002; Folkman and Rai 
1999; USDOL 2001; Borges-Méndez and Meléndez 2002a,b; Melén-
dez, Kohler-Hausmann, and Borges-Méndez 2002; Meléndez, Dono-
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hue, and Borges-Méndez 2002; Nightingale 2001, 2002; Plastrik and 
Taylor 2001). For instance, relatively large CBOs with a long history as 
service providers were more capable of negotiating their way into the 
new local regimes and defending their position as system stakeholders. 
In these systems, CBOs seemed to become primary and peer-to-peer 
operators. The politics of implementation also created conditions in 
some regions in which WIBs and local authorities had to rely on CBOs 
to become strong partners, often as OSCC operators, simply because 
local government agencies did not have the outreach or operational ca-
pacity to deliver services. At times, local and state agencies have del-
egated the management of the local public system, beyond the manage-
ment of OSCCs, to CBOs (Chicago Jobs Council 1998; Kogan, Wolff, 
and Russell 1995; Mariani 1997; McIntire and Robins 1999; National 
One-Stop Team 1996; USDOL 1998; Salzman et al. 1999).7 Examples 
of an increased role for CBOs in the operation of local systems include 
organizations such as New Community Corporation (Newark, New Jer-
sey), Central City Concern (Portland, Oregon), OICW (Menlo Park, 
California), and SER Metro-Detroit, as well as conglomerates of CBOs 
in the cities of Boston, Milwaukee, and Los Angeles. 
 The implications of the transition to the WIA for CBOs as ser-
vice providers are still unfolding. In reality, the WIA has been under 
implementation for only about five years as of this publication date. 
Most jurisdictions are just now moving out of the initial stages, having 
undertaken to lay out WIBs and OSCCs, recruit core partners, establish 
performance standards, and formulate strategic development plans. Al-
though no large-scale survey study of CBO adaptation to shifts in policy 
exists, various comparative case studies of CBOs’ (and of other service 
providers’) compliance with WIA regulations identify some short-term 
responses and patterns of adaptation to shifts in the local regulatory 
structures (O’Shea 2000; Watrus, Torkelson, and Flynn 1996; Trutko 
and Barnow 1999; D’Amico et al. 1999; Kogan et al. 1997).8 These 
changes are the first set of factors to influence the likelihood of CBOs 
becoming OSCC operators. Below we document the changes, relying 
on seven analytical categories often used in the literature for the analy-
sis of the WIA.
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Philosophy
There are two salient philosophical shifts in the WIA of particular 
relevance to CBOs. First, the WIA grants greater control and flexibility 
to local authorities in the overall management of public employment ser-
vices. At the same time, the WIA also raises the stakes, in terms of sys-
temic accountability and compliance with performance standards, and 
requires local authorities to implement performance management. The 
WIA encourages the use of market-driven mechanisms to satisfy em-
ployment and training needs and demands by creating Individual Train-
ing Accounts (ITA). Through these tuition-like vouchers it encourages 
trade schools, private vendors, and community colleges to participate 
in the system as training providers. However, under the WIA, short-
term, work first approaches to employment became significantly more 
important than training (Frank, Rahmanou, and Savner 2003). Second, 
the WIA also demands that local workforce development systems be 
driven by customer satisfaction—that of both employers and job seek-
ers. In theory, levels of satisfaction among job seekers and employers 
have to be periodically surveyed as part of performance reports. But, at 
the same time that the law encouraged greater accountability and intro-
duced more stringent performance management mechanisms, there was 
a reduction in the training dollars available, and therefore fewer incen-
tives for CBOs to participate in the system.
CBOs reported difficulties with the philosophical shift in welfare 
and workforce development policy. Not all CBOs have been acquies-
cent in making this shift, yet the changes ultimately seem to be perco-
lating into the mission statements of CBOs. The philosophical blending 
of prior programmatic commitments with new service demands does 
not mean they have abandoned their historical commitment to represent 
(mainly underprivileged) communities or to serve particular popula-
tions (Withorn 2002). However, there is a noticeable change to a new 
discourse that puts some distance between itself and the more militant, 
populist discourse from the War on Poverty era. It is also noticeable that 
mission statements now incorporate newer principles such as organiza-
tional efficiency, outcome measures, funding diversification, account-
ability, entrepreneurialism, re-engineering and strategic planning, and 
reducing welfare dependency. For CBOs to assimilate some of these 
newer principles—many taken from the private sector—oftentimes en-
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tailed changes in staffing, new approaches to client outreach and case 
management, casting a public image, and revamping operations. This 
philosophical shift, it is worth noting, is infused by an overall reformist 
movement that has captivated a significant part of the entire nonprofit 
sector and some levels of government (Kettl 2000).
Second, the most striking philosophical change for CBOs has been 
in accommodating work first approaches to employment. Many CBOs 
have stated that these approaches must be connected to, or evolve into, 
more complex interventions if they are to improve the employment out-
comes and advancement opportunities of disadvantaged workers over 
the long haul. CBOs are quite aware of this dilemma, yet they are finan-
cially strapped by the overall bias of the act and the mandated funding 
streams that primarily support work first programmatic and placement 
activities. Finally, the philosophical shift has implied rethinking tactical 
approaches to organizational and economic survival. In the new policy 
regime, performance-based agreements, vendor competition, and cus-
tomer choice are forcing CBOs to explore new programs, collabora-
tions, and network affiliations to remain competitive (Borges-Méndez 
and Meléndez 2002a,b; Meléndez, Kohler-Hausmann, and Borges-Mén- 
dez 2002; Meléndez, Donohue, and Borges-Méndez 2002; Plastrik and 
Taylor 2001).
Governance and Oversight
The WIA created Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs) to replace 
Private Industry Councils (PICs).  A state-level WIB (appointed by the 
governor) is responsible for overseeing local WIBs. The local WIB 
has jurisdiction over a specific area. The WIBs, in contrast to PICs, are 
not allowed to be direct service providers. They are primarily a policy 
body with oversight authority for WIA funding, though other funding 
streams may be delegated to the WIBs for operational integration at 
the local level. WIBs are also in charge of setting certification policies 
and procedures for local service providers.  The composition of local 
WIBs is set up to have representatives of the private business sector, 
government, labor, education, and other local stakeholders. WIBs are 
financially accountable to city or county government, or a combination 
of them.9 By the sunset of JTPA, PICs appeared to have evolved into 
passive bureaucratic-administrative agents; it is assumed that the WIBs 
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will replace them with entrepreneurialism and synergistic engagements 
with multiple sectors (public, private, and nonprofit).10 In some locales, 
WIBs remained practically identical in composition to the PICs. 
The shift from PICs to WIBs created numerous challenges to local 
areas, such as defining an optimum board size, given the unmanageable 
number of mandated partners, and recruiting local industry leadership. 
In some locales, CBOs are represented at the board and participate in 
decision-making. In particular, some large CBOs or coalitions of CBOs 
have had significant input in the governance affairs of local systems. 
This is especially true in cities and locales where CBOs are active play-
ers with political clout and have a track record in workforce program 
administration from the previous JTPA regime. In these locales, some 
large CBOs have been hands-on managers of the transition, deeply en-
gaged with some of the WIBs’ decisions on levels of funding for OS-
CCs, certification policies for service providers, and strategic orienta-
tions to grow the local employment system (Fitzgerald and Sutton 2000; 
Borges-Méndez and Meléndez 2002a,b; Meléndez, Kohler-Hausmann, 
and Borges-Méndez 2002; Meléndez, Donohue, and Borges-Méndez 
2002). However, in most areas, CBOs reported feeling alienated from 
the decision-making process and lacked adequate representation on lo-
cal WIBs. 
CBO participation on local WIBs is to a large extent a function 
of the CBO’s own board’s political activism and engagement with the 
local employment system. In our interviews, CBO managers insisted 
on the critical role of CBO board leadership in formulating and imple-
menting a pragmatic plan or vision to guide CBO positioning within the 
system. Politically, board leadership can provide an important source 
of political stewardship, especially if board members are involved and 
participate in broader political affairs. The strength of the CBO board 
leadership, however, may be related to how many of its members come 
from the private sector. Most CBOs interviewed consider strong pri-
vate sector membership to be a critical aspect of developing successful 
workforce development programs and of establishing effective work-
ing relations with employers and local WIBs. Gender, racial, ethnic 
and multicultural diversity in board membership are also critical to the 
CBO’s capacity for building networks and associations with a broad 
range of stakeholders. In addition, board leadership can act as a buffer 
between the CBO and government in regard to performance-compli-
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ance issues. Finally, CBO board leadership can act as a critical linkage 
between the CBO and its ability to connect workforce development to 
other policy arenas and issues such as economic development, hous-
ing, and health—policy areas that may improve the quality of jobs. In 
summary, board political clout, managerial expertise, and diversity are 
all critical factors in the ability of CBOs to adapt to changing policy 
regimes. Most CBOs attribute participation in the local WIB’s gover-
nance and a good part of their success in becoming OSCC operators to 
strong board leadership. 
Service Delivery Structure
The WIA seeks to increase flexibility and local autonomy in service 
delivery while also increasing service, promoting universal access, and 
integrating programs. Because of these objectives, the WIA increases 
service delivery demands upon local systems. One-stop career centers 
are institutionalized as the frontline, integrated service delivery mecha-
nism. Under the WIA, 17 categories of programs, funded through four 
separate federal agencies, are required to provide services through the 
OSCC system; the four federal agencies are the departments of Labor, 
Education, Health and Human Services, and Housing and Urban De-
velopment (U.S. General Accounting Office 2000b). All of these pro-
grams are not required to be available on-site at OSCCs, although there 
are some mandated partners that must have a presence at OSCCs and 
share a portion of operational costs. OSCC operators are selected and 
certified by local WIBs, and OSCCs can be operated by different types 
of agents: CBOs, unions, for-profit companies, city and county govern-
ments, and universities and community colleges. They often oversee 
three types of services: core, intensive, and training. The mix of such 
services is determined by WIA regulations and by local factors. 
The new service delivery requirements challenged CBOs to modi-
fy their delivery capacity. The shift to universal access, although very 
much compatible with the historical commitment of CBOs to promote 
and preserve equity in service provision, implied devoting significant 
resources for outreach among new constituencies and providing servic-
es to them. The new clients sometimes are located beyond the immedi-
ate geographic boundaries of CBO activity. In the context of complying 
with the WIA, the implementation of universal access and the work 
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first mandate implied expanding the client base and doing more intense 
follow-up activity. In recent years, CBOs have been pushed to do more 
with less while working with populations that have multiple barriers 
to employment. The relative concentration of some types of workers 
or populations within the client base of communities makes this task 
much more difficult and significantly affects the positioning of CBOs. 
In addition, the relatively larger size of welfare caseloads at the county 
(or city) level during the early implementation of the WIA offered many 
CBOs opportunities to participate in workforce development through 
work first programs. As case loads declined and Welfare-to-Work fund-
ing dried up, however, these entry opportunities diminished. Among 
those CBOs that developed work first programs, many report that they 
have not been able to upscale their services beyond work first into re-
tention or training services and are beginning to experience exclusion 
from core operations of the systems, or have become marginal (niche) 
subcontractors.  
Planning, Program Development, and Staff
JTPA stipulated two-year cycles for programming. The WIA, by 
contrast, demands that WIBs develop five-year strategic plans for their 
workforce development areas. These plans are annually revised and 
subjected to public scrutiny. Strategic plans have to be approved by the 
state WIB, which then submits a unified strategy to the federal Depart-
ment of Labor. Providers receiving more than a certain level of funding 
from local WIBs are also required to submit strategic plans, especially 
providers in charge of managing OSCCs.11 The demands of a plan with 
a five-year strategic horizon implied ridding the CBO organizational 
culture of “back-of-the-envelope” planning or of rigid request-for-pro-
posal (RFP) driven program development.  The new planning outlook 
would have to combine long-term strategies of sustainability with per-
formance evaluation considerations, giving particular attention to re-
tention, customer satisfaction, and program integration. The implica-
tions for program development that derive from a more competitive 
environment are apparent. In the new regime, funding allocation and 
re-approval as vendors would be connected not to pre-negotiated con-
tractual levels but to actual performance in a range of core, intensive, 
and training services. 
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Responses to the new planning and program development demands 
varied among CBOs. Some large CBOs, already having experienced 
the political and economic challenges of a prior era, actively engaged in 
adaptive practices, especially in diversifying funding portfolios (includ-
ing government contracts) and, to the extent possible, reduced depen-
dency on government funding. The shift from contract-based to perfor-
mance-based, at the most immediate level, implied fronting significant 
funds in developing and complying with the new policy mandates with-
out assurances of recovering expenditures and investments in the new 
WIA-induced infrastructures. In contrast, smaller CBOs experienced a 
difficult time in adapting to the new planning demands. Changes in the 
planning horizon and in the orientation of programs—for instance, into 
more work first approaches and customer choice—required leadership 
and boards of directors in CBOs to become more proactive in terms of 
engaging the private sector and newer partners.12 
CBO size and specialization were important determinants of how 
CBOs responded to the demands imposed by planning new programs 
and adapting resources and capacity to the local performance regimes. 
In this context, CBOs’ deployment of human resources and staff be-
came a major force in determining CBOs’ positioning within the OSCC 
systems.  Large CBOs had more flexibility in restructuring the organiza-
tion. For instance, the professional development of CBO staff facilitates 
compliance with the stronger, performance-driven approach brought by 
the WIA. CBOs also developed new marketing strategies, which they 
deployed at various levels and through multiple media. CBOs intending 
to become visible and effective at recruitment hired marketing special-
ists and technology managers. Practically all primary operators have 
developed a new battery of instruments to meet the outreach require-
ments of programs targeting welfare recipients and the WIA mandate 
for universal access. Similarly, reaching out to employers has also en-
tailed revamping the skills of job developers and traditional case man-
agers or social workers. In part, CBOs met these challenges by promot-
ing cross-training, teamwork, and learning from experience within the 
organization.  Finally, CBO positioning in the OSCC system has been 
influenced by the resources devoted to strengthen management systems 
in areas such as case management, participant tracking, performance 
reporting, fundraising, and accounting.
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Market Competition
The WIA opens the local systems to increased competition among 
service providers through the use of Individual Training Accounts 
(ITAs), a tuition-like, portable training voucher. The reasoning behind 
the ITAs is to encourage trade schools and community colleges to de-
velop more programs targeting disadvantaged populations, while pro-
viding more training options for workers. However, to most CBOs, the 
idea of market competition through training vouchers was an entirely 
new concept. In our interviews, most CBOs—large or small—reported 
that they were not prepared to enter into such competition for various 
reasons. First, competition increased turf battles for funding, clients, 
and service delivery markets. This dispersed the political influence of 
CBOs and thus their ability to engage in meaningful decision-making 
in the restructured local employment services system. Second, trade 
schools and community colleges coming into the ITA market were like-
ly to be better equipped than CBOs to compete for tuition-like funds 
and clients. In fact, the WIA was structured to give an initial advan-
tage to community colleges by providing a one-year grace period for 
initial certification. Many CBOs perceived that the field was not level 
even before competition was unleashed. Third, increased competitive 
pressures came simultaneously with demands for greater accountability 
and performance, which for many CBOs represented a management 
challenge given the inordinate volume of data collection and reporting 
required for participating in the program. Finally, the implementation 
of ITAs introduced a great deal of uncertainty for CBOs: Would ITAs 
contribute to draining resources from nonprofits into the private sector? 
Would ITAs be captured by the new providers and leave CBOs simply 
to specialize in core and intensive services? Would ITAs be available, 
or would they become too difficult for the CBOs’ constituencies to get 
access to (Trutko and Barnow 1999)? 
Despite these barriers, some CBOs that are large primary opera-
tors and some CBOs that are in peer-to-peer networks redesigned their 
programs and management system to participate in the ITA program. 
Redesigning programs to benefit from ITAs, however, depended on 
having a strong history of providing employment services and training 
facilities in-house, like OICW in Menlo Park. Some primary operators 
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have created sister or affiliate branches that provide the training service 
sought by ITA clients, like SER Metro-Detroit. In this regard, the CBOs 
that could integrate the ITA into a pre-existing training infrastructure or 
experience have benefited. In addition, strong connections to the pri-
vate sector and good relations with city and county government greatly 
influenced the successful use of ITAs by CBOs. Getting to be a train-
ing provider certified by the local WIB and setting ITA expenditure 
levels are critical to the feasibility of using the ITA program. Both are 
negotiated processes that involve local authorities, WIBs, and provid-
ers, especially since ITA expenditure levels are not preset by federal 
authorities. 
Local competitive conditions and relations among providers also 
influenced CBO positioning within the OSCC. Not all cities, counties, 
or regions show the same mix and density of labor market intermediar-
ies or have the same history regarding collaboration and networking 
among stakeholders. Large and densely populated markets are often 
contested by large and experienced intermediaries. The Los Angeles 
metro area is a case in point. In its markets, smaller CBOs face higher 
entry barriers and operational costs. In such cases, large CBOs may be 
able to make their way into the system through their political capabili-
ties or by demonstrating their comparative advantage in the provision 
of services. The Los Angeles Urban League’s (LAUL) political clout 
facilitates its positioning as primary operator in a heavily contested 
market for workforce development services. Smaller CBOs may sim-
ply stay away from the WIA funding or become subcontractors provid-
ing very specific services. Alternatively, in a few locales CBOs decided 
to work together and form collaborations. The success of this strategy 
depends upon the history of networking and operational collaboration 
in the area. The greater Boston area contains examples of these kinds 
of collaborative relations. In Boston, Jewish Vocational Services (JVS) 
in collaboration with the Economic Development and Industrial Cor-
poration’s Office of Jobs and Community Services (EDIC/JCS) and the 
Higher Education Center, manage one of the city’s three OSCCs. In 
locales with smaller and less competitive labor markets and relatively 
weak government agencies, some CBOs have become central operators 
in the system, often in charge of managing the entire OSCC system. In 
Menlo Park and Detroit, OICW and SER, respectively, anchor the local 
systems. In Detroit, SER and two other organizations, JVS and Ross, 
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administer the local OSCC system under a charter from the WIB. In all 
of these circumstances, WIBs are responsible for shaping the structure 
of local or regional employment services markets through the charter-
ing of OSCCs and certification policies. Local discretion by WIBs and 
flexibility in policy implementation, however, can push the process in 
one of two directions, either facilitating or hindering CBOs’ access to 
the market. 
Program and Funding Streams
Under JTPA, low income was a criteria for program eligibility for 
adults, youth, and displaced workers. The WIA preserves those three 
main target groups but shifts to universal access regardless of income. 
In addition, with the new emphasis on universal access the WIA im-
posed requirements on the 17 programs spread across four departments. 
Title I of the WIA absorbs most of the JTPA programs. Other changes 
fall under other title sections of the act. Title II replaced the Adult Edu-
cation Act with the Adult Education and Family Act. Title III amended 
the Wagner-Peyser Act, which established the Employment Service. 
The Title III section transformed that service into the foundation of the 
OSCC system by requiring that its information and labor exchange ac-
tivity be provided as part of the OSCC system. Title IV amended the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which set requirements for vocational re-
habilitation (U.S. General Accounting Office 2001a,b).13 A number of 
those programs, like Welfare-to-Work and the Migrant and Seasonal 
Farm Worker Employment and Training Program, are currently being 
phased out and new ones are being created for faith-based organiza-
tions.14 At the level of OSCCs, services stemming from these diverse 
streams and programs, then, are required to be funneled into a three-tier 
(sequential) system of core, intensive, and training services (U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office 2000a,b). 
Historically, CBOs have been quite capable at integrating services 
that have multiple funding streams (Nightingale 2001). The WIA, how-
ever, posed a newer challenge, in two ways. First, the consolidation of 
program and funding streams came with more stringent demands of per-
formance accountability (especially on job retention) and customer sat-
isfaction among job seekers and employers. Thus, significant resources 
were necessary to harmonize case data and accounting management 
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systems to meet and report on the new standards. These resources for 
adaptation were, for the most part, nonexistent, except where some of 
the funding for the early implementation of the act may have been po-
litically negotiated to address the specific needs of CBOs, which were 
operating as subcontractors (U.S. General Accounting Office 2002; 
Borges-Méndez and Meléndez 2002a,b; Meléndez, Kohler-Hausmann, 
and Borges-Méndez 2002; Meléndez, Donohue, and Borges-Méndez 
2002). Mainly, it has been the large primary operators, such as OICW 
in Menlo Park, the Los Angeles Urban League, and SER Metro-De-
troit, that have been able to carry forward with program integration, 
although not without problems. The technology, staff, and continuous 
client satisfaction surveys for multiple programs and multilingual pop-
ulations that receive services across various sites are extremely difficult 
to maintain. Various administrators commented that their organizations 
seem to be “working to maintain the system” instead of working to 
improve the quality of services. Second, internal program and service 
integration within any particular provider would require partial harmo-
nization with other kinds of partners in various settings. The need for 
harmonization would clearly emerge in the processes of implementing 
OSCCs, of creating chains of service provision, of meeting the partner-
ship requirements of the law, or of implementing networks of providers 
in order to organize and process referrals. Given that many providers do 
not necessarily provide all three kinds of core, service, and training ser-
vices in one location, these networks help organize the various types of 
services among providers. In terms of external harmonization, greater 
local autonomy and flexibility in service integration are likely to create 
both negative and positive networking externalities for CBOs and other 
agents (Cordero-Guzmán 2002; Harrison and Weiss 1998).15 Increased 
interaction in the form of networks, partnerships, and collaborative pro-
gramming and service delivery could become not only laboratories of 
innovation, but nodules of friction and conflict.
Performance Standards 
The JTPA was a contract-based system in which funds were allocat-
ed to providers according to pre-negotiated and preset levels of service 
provision. The WIA is a performance-based system in which provid-
ers are partly reimbursed for achieving performance targets. The JTPA 
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placed little emphasis on retention and follow-up of clients, whereas 
the WIA establishes strong provisions of systemic accountability that 
require data to be gathered on services provided, placements, and reten-
tion (up to a year after placement). The Department of Labor requires 
data from OSCCs on 17 performance indicators and periodic customer 
satisfaction surveys of job seekers and employers. The WIA also ties 
cost reimbursement to meeting performance targets. 
The issues of performance and accountability are shaped by the 
power dynamics of intergovernmental relations and the devolution of 
the federal system.16 During the implementation of the WIA, for CBOs 
to meet new standards in retention, follow-up, and customer satisfac-
tion entailed filling out more paperwork and taking on greater bureau-
cratic loads. Many CBOs reported that enhancing services and gaining 
inclusion implied implementing changes in staffing, managerial phi-
losophies, coalition-building, and partnership development. In some re-
gards, by doing so CBOs are opening themselves to greater public and 
political scrutiny. In antagonistic political environments, such openness 
may not be in CBOs’ best interests, as it can be used not to effect con-
structive policy change but to narrow the range of inclusion of CBOs in 
public policy making. The prospect of having to disclose performance 
under unfriendly or punitive political conditions has certainly affected 
the political calculus and thus the choices of CBOs. In many local con-
texts, the technical difficulties of raising performance levels and achiev-
ing those higher levels in service delivery are inevitably transformed 
into political justifications to further shed CBOs from service delivery 
systems (Borges-Méndez and Meléndez 2002a,b; Meléndez, Kohler-
Hausmann, and Borges-Méndez 2002; Meléndez, Donohue, and Bor-
ges-Méndez 2002).17 OICW in Menlo Park, for instance, reported that 
there was a continual battle for placement and retention numbers, refer-
ring to the difficulties in claiming a successful placement after program 
participants have undergone various sequential programs. Also, OICW 
indicated that the prospects of forming partnerships between CBOs and 
community colleges have been discouraged by the performance report-
ing requirements of the WIA. Some community colleges see reporting 
requirements as intrusive and excessive.
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THE GENERAL INFLUENCE OF THE LAW ON THE TYPES 
OF CBO-OSCC POSITIONING 
From the discussion of the multiple dimensions of the law, various 
observations are pertinent. First, CBOs that are primary and peer-to-
peer operators of OSCCs have been able to accommodate some of the 
WIA’s philosophical principles, like the work first mandate, within the 
broader scope of their historical mission. Such has been the case with 
large multidivisional, multiservice CBOs like LAUL, OICW, UMOS, 
SER Metro-Detroit, and New Community Corporation, which have 
a long-standing and well established history of program and political 
management. This gives them the flexibility to modify program struc-
ture without changing their mission. Although they are in disagreement 
with work first approaches to workforce development, these organiza-
tions adapted to the change and combined it within other initiatives, 
like career ladders and skills training, that complemented the short-term 
outlook of the work first approach. Also, at times, they negotiated pro-
gram modifications to work first, such as changing OSCC funding al-
location formulae, using their leverage as recognized service providers 
and political stewards within their jurisdictions. Admittedly, these are 
large organizations with above average annual budgets and more than 
20 years of existence, among other attributes. However, mid-size CBOs, 
with solidly established track records in specific functional areas such 
as health, education, or human services have also become successful 
OSCC primary operators or are partnering in established OSCCs. This 
may be attributable to their specialized expertise and performance as 
service providers rather than as all encompassing CBOs. Small CBOs, 
mainly recently founded ones, seem to be more likely to become sub-
ordinate subcontractors to the extent that they have less resources and 
organizational capital to invest in program restructuring without signifi-
cant shifts in their overall mission objectives. 
Second, CBOs that have become primary and peer-to-peer opera-
tors directly participate in the governance of the public employment 
and OSCC systems. That is, CBOs are service providers but they are 
often also members of their local WIBs and active participants in the 
decision making process along with local administrators. In addition, 
this participation in governance of the system serves as a connection to 
other collaborations that are formed by such interaction, like industry-
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focused workforce development initiatives or partnerships with profes-
sional associations. CBOs acting in more subordinate roles participate 
more indirectly or sporadically in the governance of these systems, al-
though on occasion large CBOs become the conduit for smaller CBOs 
to participate in the governance of the local system. 
Third, the introduction of ITAs has produced a mixed effect upon 
CBO positioning. ITAs are difficult to access and monitor. Even some of 
the large CBOs that have become primary operators have not been able 
to use them. Only CBOs that have close-knit and multilevel workforce 
development programs with employers seem to be capable of using and 
promoting ITAs among their clients. The integrated programs include 
training, curriculum development, and joint fundraising, among other 
features. SER Metro-Detroit and OICW fit this description. ITAs, for 
the most part, are too difficult to handle by CBOs in subordinate roles. 
Fourth, the WIA, and welfare reform in general, demands program 
and funding stream consolidation, and thus much program coordina-
tion and harmonization on the part of service providers. CBOs that 
are primary and peer-to-peer operators have been able to manage this 
challenge through various kinds of efficiency-enhancing activities or 
through networking with other organizations. For instance, CBOs have 
implemented service quality-control practices, have created technologi-
cal management units and service matrices, have cross-trained staff to 
facilitate multi-program interventions, and have diversified collabora-
tions. CBOs in subordinate positions cannot accommodate or manage 
these dynamics for various reasons, including organizational size, lack 
of partners, inhospitable political conditions, or lack of human resourc-
es. But among larger CBOs, the North Texas Human Resource Group 
has been actively engaged in training OSCC frontline staff. OICW has 
strongly pursued technological modernization to improve case manage-
ment across programs. Boston Career Link, an OSCC, has sought har-
monization through intensive networking and collaborative integration 
between CBOs with distinct competitive advantages in fields ranging 
from health and human services to accounting and management. 
Fifth, the mandate and challenge of universal access has placed 
CBOs in a double bind—both philosophically and in terms of service 
delivery. Historically, CBOs have served as advocates and service pro-
viders for a broad range of populations and constituencies. However, 
this commitment can hit resource limits when various other factors are 
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considered for service delivery, such as the capacity to handle an in-
creased volume of clients, shifting neighborhood demographics that de-
mand newer cultural competencies, or a rapidly deteriorating job base 
in the region. CBOs that were able to become primary operators and 
peer-to-peer operators had the capacity to underwrite and execute the 
scaling up of operations. They may have upgraded through any of sev-
eral avenues, such as creating newer entities to improve financial sus-
tainability, absorbing smaller CBOs with relevant attributes and compe-
tencies, entering into partnerships with other organizations, and chang-
ing or adding geographic locations. For instance, SER Metro-Detroit 
has created, or spun off from itself, various organizations to optimize 
relations with employers in order to advance a high-volume placement 
strategy. The San Diego Career Opportunities Partners organization has 
tackled the dilemma through a more horizontal organizational struc-
ture that promotes partnerships outside of contractual Memorandums 
of Understanding (MOUs). El Proyecto del Barrio in Los Angeles has 
simply decided to aggressively diversify operations into workforce de-
velopment from a strong service platform and expertise in health and 
human services. 
Finally, under the WIA, complying with the newly created perfor-
mance standards seems tremendously relevant to CBO positioning. 
Some CBOs said that the decision to establish an OSCC, a satellite 
center, or not to participate in the system rested upon the prospects of 
complying with the new standards.18 Among the factors given by CBOs 
that weighed on their decision whether to participate in the OSCC sys-
tem were 1) cost of human resources and technology, 2) additional (and 
apparently irrelevant) paperwork, 3) inter-jurisdictional conflicts, 4) 
added general uncertainty in program planning, and 5) simple objection 
to incomprehensible indicators that had no practical application. Not-
withstanding, primary operators have taken up the challenge of adapt-
ing to the new performance regime. LAUL has incorporated into the 
management of its three OSCCs a complex system of quality control 
that links programmatic and organizational performance at various lev-
els, including staff performance, program outcomes, and staff training 
needs determined by client feedback. And OICW in Menlo Park has de-
cisively taken over the shaping of the client tracking and performance 
system in light of San Mateo County’s inability to get an electronic data 
base and card system up and running.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The impact of the implementation of the WIA on CBO positioning 
has been uneven. Changes brought upon CBOs by the WIA are not the 
sole influence on their positioning. Other environmental and organiza-
tional factors are at play, such as policy devolution, the history and mis-
sion of CBOs, and the quality of connectedness to other actors in local 
workforce development systems. These factors have triggered differen-
tiated responses on the part of CBOs and multiple paths of adaptation.
Some large, old, and well-established CBOs have been able to adapt 
to the changes and to incorporate some of the fundamental mandates 
of the new law, such as the universal access and work first approaches. 
In the process, however, they have also used the operational flexibil-
ity granted by the law to local agents to challenge, and on occasion 
to modify, some aspects of the implementation of the law at the local 
level, such as OSCC funding allocation formulae, responsibilities in 
system-wide management, multi-jurisdictional data management stan-
dards, and partnership requirements. As primary operators of OSCCs, 
some CBOs have gone a step further, combining and interconnecting 
work first approaches with other long-term outlooks to workforce de-
velopment. These may include career-ladder development, complex 
and multilevel collaborations with employers, industrial cluster devel-
opment strategies, and strong social service support to assure retention 
and long-term individual and family stability. Conversely, other, small-
er CBOs with far less resources experienced a more difficult transition, 
having either to exit the system or become subordinate subcontractors. 
Both responses, however, pose a dilemma for all CBOs, one that has 
to do with the search for pragmatic approaches to combining commit-
ment and performance—two goals that can be at odds with each other 
in the context of CBOs having to serve, represent, and advocate for 
disadvantaged workers that are increasingly disenfranchised by welfare 
reforms.
This complex interaction between CBOs’ overall commitment to 
serving disadvantaged populations and their necessity to provide ser-
vices under the pressures of more stringent performance standards cre-
ates several organizational dilemmas.  At the programmatic level, CBOs 
have become the main integrators of various funding streams from the 
WIA and other sources from the areas of education, disability, Medi-
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caid, Housing and Urban Development, social policy, and transporta-
tion. The WIA contemplated this kind of interface to produce integrated 
workforce development systems yet made few proposals and offered 
few resources for CBOs to do so. By remaining in clear compliance 
with the law and going beyond the mandate, CBOs have added value to 
the system in this role. 
CBOs have also shown operational flexibility in terms of covering 
new geographic areas and neighborhoods, attending to new populations, 
implementing technological improvements, promoting the cross-train-
ing of staff, and articulating increased coordination with new agencies. 
CBOs who became OSCC operators have often implemented internal 
capacity-building strategies. Some organizations are already following 
all-encompassing improvement strategies built on models and prin-
ciples of “total quality management,” “learning communities,” “non-
profit sustainability,” “leadership and multicultural development,” and 
“customer satisfaction,” as well as using more traditional tools drawn 
from the world of organizational management and community devel-
opment (community organizing, empowerment, and activism). These 
ideas are being extended to shape OSCCs’ operations. It is worth not-
ing that several stakeholders sponsoring these strategies for capacity 
building, such as the National Association of Workforce Boards or the 
National Governors Association, also play a critical role in lobbying for 
their constituents at policy making levels of government. CBO activity 
in this regard appears more scattered and disconnected. In some cases, 
CBOs may be affiliated with national umbrella organizations or may 
be chapter affiliates of a larger matrix organization; such affiliations 
offer some opportunity to become more actively involved in policy set-
ting activities. CBOs at the local level, especially those working within 
peer-to-peer arrangements and broader community development pro-
grams, have come together on a more organized and permanent basis, 
forming service provider coalitions and influencing a workforce devel-
opment policy agenda. 
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Notes
 1.  According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (2001a, p. 6, n. 10), “Labor 
introduced the one-stop concept in 1994, when it began awarding implementa-
tion grants to help states bring Labor-funded employment and training programs 
into a single infrastructure.” Also, before the WIA, some states had reformed 
their employment and training programs and had created OSCCs, along with 
other reforms in social welfare policy.
 2.  We carried out these site visits as an indirect result of other research projects on 
related issue involving the following organizations: Los Angeles Urban League, 
OICW, UMOS, SER Metro-Detroit, CETA, Asian Resources, Boston Career 
Link, and JVS-Boston.
 3.  Numerous cases of partnerships and promising practices are in Clymer, Rob-
erts, and Strawn (2001) and in AFL-CIO Working For America Institute (2001). 
The specific profiles of the cases and organizations are available at http://www 
.workingforamerica.org/documents/HighRoadReport/highroadreport.htm.
 4. For a list of faith-based organizations in workforce development see Bender 
(2003).
 5. In our list of cases we have organizations that might qualify as faith-based orga-
nizations, as they were founded by religious or ecumenical coalitions or move-
ments. Through the years, however, they have become more secular in their 
service provision activity. This is the case with OICW, Goodwill Industries, and 
the Jewish Vocational Service (JVS) in Boston and Detroit.
 6. SER is an acronym for Service, Employment, and Redevelopment–Jobs for 
Progress. SER Metro-Detroit is a multiservice, community-based corporation 
established in 1971. For more information, see its Web site, http://www.sermetro 
.org.
 7. Most of these reports, as well as a whole host of implementation manuals and 
guidebooks on the WIA institutional infrastructure, can be found at the Web site 
of the Employment and Training Administration, http://www.doleta.gov (ac-
cessed Spring 2003).
 8. Recently a large-scale survey of faith-based organizations was made available. 
See Bender (2003).
 9. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (2001a, pp. 11–12), “There 
are 54 state workforce investment boards and approximately 600 local boards 
(including District of Columbia, U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Guam). 
WIA listed what types of members should participate on the workforce invest-
ment boards, but did not prescribe a minimum number of members. Also, it 
allowed governors to select representatives from various segments of the work-
force investment community, including business, education, labor, and other or-
ganizations with experience in the delivery of workforce investment activities 
to be represented on the state boards. The specifics of the local board mem-
bership were similar to those for the state.” Also, according to a recent study 
by the Charitable Choice Center and the University Center for Academic and 
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Workforce Development at the University at Albany, State University of New 
York (SUNY), “On April 17, 2002, USDOL issued a Training and Employment 
Guidance Letter (No.17-01) requesting: ‘that states take actions to broaden the 
number of grassroots community-based organizations, including faith-based or-
ganizations, which partner with Local Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs) 
and the One-Stop Career Centers.’ ” The report adds, “On July 1, 2002, USDOL 
became the first federal agency to award grants targeted specifically at states and 
intermediary organizations. As a result, $17.5 million was awarded to 12 states 
and 29 organizations in an effort to link faith-based and grassroots community 
organizations to the One-Stop Career Center system” (Bender 2003).
 10. On PICs becoming passive bureaucratic entities, see Lafer (2002). On trying 
to make WIBs more active agents, see The Workforce Board Development Se-
ries, published by the National Association of Workforce Boards. The series 
includes titles such as Workforce Board Leadership: Advice from Experienced 
CEOs (2001), and Putting Your WIB on the Political Map: Tips on Marketing, 
Communications and Public Relations (2000). The NAWB is a member of the 
Business Coalition for Workforce Development, a group of 35 national busi-
ness organizations “helping employers set up effective training and employment 
systems under the federal Workforce Investment Act” (National Association of 
Workforce Boards  2000, p. 3).
 11. The required level varies, being determined and negotiated locally.
 12. On the overall adaptation of CBOs to performance-based contracting see Sanger 
(2000). Other important works on the adaptation of nonprofits (CBOs among 
them) to structural changes in subcontracting, devolution, and privatization are 
Boris and Steurle (1999) and Smith and Lipsky (1993).
 13. See the text of the full act at http://www.doleta.gov/reports/docs/legislation (ac-
cessed July 2, 2004).
 14. A summary of the cutbacks can be found in the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
Summary of ETA Fiscal Year 2003 Request, at http://www.doleta.gov/budget/
03reqsum.pdf (accessed July 2, 2004).
 15. One of the objectives of the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Jobs Initiative has 
been to support and document patterns of collaboration and networking in vari-
ous cities. See Fleisher (2001) and Annie E. Casey Foundation (2001). The An-
nie E. Casey Foundation publications can be downloaded from http://www.aecf 
.org.
16. The essays in Sawicky (1999) provide an overview of the governmental changes 
that have taken place in various policy areas as a result of devolution. For more 
comprehensive and in-depth accounts of federal devolution and of the last major 
welfare reform, see Conlan (1998) and Weaver (2000). For some of the implica-
tions of the New Federalism and devolution on social policy research method-
ologies, see Bell (1999) and King (1999).
 17. These observations unfold from the authors’ research on four cases of the value-
added contribution of CBOs to the OSCC system.
 18. A “satellite” is a reduced-functions OSCC that can depend on a formal OSCC 
and does not have all of the partnership and service requirements of a full-blown 
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center. A satellite can be used to offer services in far away locations or places 
(neighborhoods, workplaces) that may not need all of the services demanded by 
the law. Satellites can be used and created for other strategic or outreach pur-
poses as well, such as to increase the participation of organizations that cannot 
afford to run OSCCs or that cannot meet some of the certification requirements 
established by WIBs.
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